BYU Law Review
Volume 1978 | Issue 3

Article 10

9-1-1978

Due Process-A Substantive Due Process Attack on
the Price-Anderson Act-Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Energy and Utilities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Due Process-A Substantive Due Process Attack on the Price-Anderson Act-Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 1978
BYU L. Rev. 756 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1978/iss3/10

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Due Process-A SUBSTANTIVE
DUEPROCESS
A'ITACK
ON THE PRICE-

ANDERSONACT-Duke Power Co.

u. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978).

Duke Power Company obtained permits from the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)' authorizing the construction of two atomic powered electric generating p l a n k 2These
plants are located on popular recreational lakes within a twentymile radius of Charlotte, North C a r ~ l i n aA
. ~number of residents
in the vicinity of the two plants, along with other concerned individuals, joined with the Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., to oppose Duke Power's construction and operation of these
nuclear power plants.'
The Price-Anderson Act,5 adopted in 1957, sets an upper
limit of $560 million on the aggregate liability of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC-the current successor of the AEC)
licensees for damages arising out of a single nuclear incident! In
the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrenceM7the Act re1. The Atomic Energy commission was created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
ch. 724, § 2, 60 Stat. 755 (current version a t 42 U.S.C. $ 8 2011-2296 (1976)). The AEC
was abolished and its regulatory functions transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88
Stat. 1233 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 5801-5891 (1976)). This Case Note will refer to the
Commission as the NRC except in those circumstances in which reference to the AEC is
necessary to preserve the historical context.
2. Construction permits are issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 4 2235 (1976).
3. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc. v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203,206 (W.D.N.C. 1977),
reo'd, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978).
4. Id. a t 205.
5. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified a t 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976)).
6. 42 U.S.C. !j 2210(e) (1976).See notes 19-30 and accompanying text infra for a more
detailed explanation of the provisions of the Act.
7. The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is defined a t 42 U.S.C. 8 2014(j)
(1976):
The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" means any event causing a
discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its
intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels
offsite, which the Commission determines to be substantial, and which the
Commission determines has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite. Any determination by the Commission
that such an event has, or has not, occurred shall be final and conclusive, and
no other official or any court shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such
determination. The Commission shall establish criteria in writing setting forth
the basis upon which such determination shall be made. As used in this subsection, "offsite" means away from "the location" or "the contract location" as
defined in the applicable Commission indemnity agreement, entered into pursuant to section 2210 of this title.
Specific regulations as to the minimum levels of offsite radiation and damages that must
be met before the NRC may declare an incident an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence"
are found a t 10 C.F.R. 0 0 140.81-.85 (1978).
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quires NRC licensees to waive 4 1 issues or defenses of negligence,
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and governmental or
charitable i r n m ~ n i t y . ~
The Carolina Environmental Study Group brought an action
in federal district court against the AEC and Duke Power Company seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the PriceAnderson Act upper limit on aggregate liability. The district
court held that the Act was in violation of the due process clause
of the fifth amendment "because it allows the destruction of the
property or the lives of those ayfected by a nuclear catastrophe
without reasonable certainty that the victims will be justly comp e n ~ a t e d . "On
~ direct appeal to the Supreme CourtlO,thelower
court judgment was unanimously reversed." The Court held that
the Act was not violative of the due process clause since it was a
legitimate, and not arbitrary or irrational, attempt to serve the
dual purpose of protecting the public and encouraging the development of nuclear power.12

A. Legislative History and Purpose of the Price-Anderson Act
The responsibility for the early development of nuclear energy in the United States rested entirely with the federal government, primarily with the armed forces. Following World War I1
and after much debate on the desirability of allowing private
industry to avail itself of this potentially great source of energy,
the Atomic Energy Act of 194613and the Atomic Energy Act of
195414were passed permitting the private sector to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under strict regulation by the
AEC.'The Price-Anderson Act was an effort to reconcile compet8. 42 U.S.C. Ej 2210(n) (1976).
9. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc. v. AEC, 431 F. Supp. 203,222 (W.D.N.C. 1977)
reu'd, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978).
10. An.appea1 can be taken directly to the Supreme Court if a district court holds
an act of Congress unconstitutional in a suit to which an agency of the United States is a
party. 28 U.S.C. Ej 1252 (1976).
11. Although all nine Justices concurred in the result, Justices Stewart, Rehnquist,
and Stevens wrote separate opinions indicating that they would have reversed on the
threshold issues of standing, ripeness, or subject-matter jurisdiction and would have never
considered the due process issue. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, Inc.,
98 S. Ct. 2620,2641-46 (1978) (separate opinions concurring in the result only by Stewart,
Rehnquist, & Stevens, JJ.).
12. Id. a t 2635 (majority opinion).
13. Ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §Ej 2011-2296 (1976)).
14. Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified a t 42 U.S.C. $8 2011-2296 (1976)).
15. Wilson, Nuclear Liability and the Price-Anderson Act, 12 FORUM 612, 612-13
(1977).

758

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[1978:

ing interests that became apparent after the initial decision was
made to turn over development of the peacetime use of nuclear
power to private industry. The nature of these interests is readily
ascertainable from the stated objectives of the Act: (1)to assure
the public of the availability of funds sufficient to satisfy liability
claims arising out of a catastrophic nuclear accident, and (2) to
set an upper limit on the aggregate dollar amount to be paid in
compensation for these claims, thus removing the impediment to
private sector participation caused by a fear of unlimited liability
in the event of a major catastrophe.16
The limited protection provided by the Act would have expired on August 1, 1967, approximately ten years from the date
of its passage? The Act, however, has been modified and extended twice for additional ten-year periods.l8 Besides serving to
prolong the life of Price-Anderson protection, these congressional
extensions provided an opportunity for periodic review and significant amendment of the Act.

B. Mechanics of the Price-Anderson Act
The Price-Anderson Act creates two sources of funds for satisfying liability claims arising out of the activities of NRC
licensees. The licensee is responsible for the "first level of financial protection," defined as the maximum amount of liability
insurance available from private source^.'^ The NRC is in essence
responsible for the second level since it is required to then indemnify the licensee for compensatory damages paid out in excess of
-

-

16. AEC Staff Study of the Price-Anderson Act: Part I, ATOM.ENERGY
L.J. 205,20607 (1974). The Price-Anderson Act added the following statement to the congressional
findings of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act:
In order to protect the public and to encourage the development of the
atomic energy industry, in the interests of the general welfare and of the common defense and security, the United States may make funds available for a
portion of the damages suffered by the public from nuclear incidents, and may
limit the liability of those persons liable for such losses.
42 U.S.C. 5 2012(i) (1976).
17. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 5 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 9 2210
(1976)).
18. The Act was first extended to Aug. 1, 1977, Pub. L. No. 89-210, 5 4, 79 Stat. 855
(1965); and later to Aug. 1, 1987, Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 5 5, 89 Stat.
1111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 9 2210 (1976)).
19. 42 U.S.C. 5 2210(b) (1976). The amount of protection required in 1957 was $60
million. The current level of protection required for major reactor sites is $125 million.
Lowenstein, The Price-Anderson Act: An Imaginative Approach to Public Liability
Concerns, 12 FORUM 594, 599 (1977). The applicable regulations are found in 10 C.F.R.
09 140.11-.12 (1978).
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the initial level of financial p r o t e ~ t i o n An
. ~ ~upper limit of $560
million is set on the amount of aggregate liability arising from any
one nuclear incidentn2IIn exchange for the indemnification agreement, the NRC is authorized to collect a substantial fee from all
licensees covered by the
To ensure that all potential claims are given adequate consideration, the Act allows application by any indemnitor or other
interested person to the federal district court having venue in
bankruptcy over the location of a nuclear incident. Upon a finding that total liability to the public will likely exceed the maximum limit, the district court is granted great latitude in the
administration of the payment of claims, including t h power
~
to
apportion payments from the $560 million liability fund among
claimants while reserving some funds for the payment of future
Shortly after Congress voted the Price-Anderson Act its first
ten-year extension, the Act was amended to include the waiver
of defenses," thereby imposing on those protected by the Act a
burden of strict statutory liability.25Under current provisions of
the Act, the defendant NRC licensee must waive:
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of
persons indemnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or
20. 42 U.S.C. (j 2210(c) (1976).
21. Id.. (j 2210(e).
22. Id. (j 2210(f). This fee is not insignificant. One commentator relates that
the government collects an annual indemnity fee from each power reactor licensee. This fee is assessed on a flat basis of $30 per thousand kilowatts of
thermal energy authorized in the license; since a typical modern power reactor
has a power level of about 3000 to 3300 MWth (corresponding to about 1000 to
1100 MW), the annual indemnity fee for such plants is about $90,000 to $99,000.
This fee is not a premium and has no actuarial basis. Furthermore, although
about three-fourths of the insurance premiums collected in the years 1956-67
have been returned by the nuclear liability insurance pools to policyholders
because of the industry's safety record, the indemnity fees are not returnable.
. . . [?lo date the government has collected millions of dollars in indemnity fees, but has not paid out one dollar in claims . . . .
Lowenstein, supra note 19, at 600-01.
23. 42 U.S.C. (j 2210(0) (1976).
24. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (codified a t 42 U.S.C. 8
2210(n) (1976)).
25. The waiver provisions are not effective until the Commission determines that
certain minimum thresholds of damages are surpassed. The threshold levels are set out
in 10 C.F.R. (j(j 140.84-.85 (1978). If damages do not exceed these limits, plaintiffs must
rely on common law theories of recovery. This aspect of the Act has generated considerable
comment. See, e.g., Comment, The Irradiated Plaintiff: Tort Recovery Outside &iceAnderson, 6 ENVT'LL. 859 (1976); Note, The "Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence"
L.J.
Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Rice-Anderson Act, 6 RUT.-CAM.
360 (1974).
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governmental immunity, and (iii) any issue or defense based on
any statute of limitations if suit is instituted within three years
from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably
could have known, of his injury or damage and the cause
thereof, but in no event more than twenty years after the date
of the nuclear in~ident.~"

The second ten-year extension of Price-Anderson protection
brought further changes. Congress amended the Act to create a
scheme whereby the indemnification now provided by the NRC
will be replaced by a system of deferred premiums imposed directly on all NRC licensees in the event of a nuclear incident
where aggregate liability exceeds the amount of the primary level
of financial protection required of each licen~ee.~'
The 1975
26. 42 U.S.C. # 2210(n)(l) (1976).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1976). The deferred premium system created by the 1975
amendment is summarized by one commentator:
The amendment provides for two major changes:
1. gradual substitution of industry financed indemnity for government indemnity above the amount of insurance available and,
2. an increase in the limit of liability.
The statute provides for a phasing out of governmental indemnity through
a provision requiring that in the event of a nuclear incident which results in
damages in excess of the base layer of insurance (now $125 million), each
licensee will be assessed a prorated share of the excess damages (a "deferred
premium"). The amendment authorized NRC to set the level of the deferred
premium a t no less than $2 million and no more than $5 million per facility.
Under the bill, the NRC will continue to provide indemnity for payment of
damages exceeding the combined primary insurance layer, and the secondary
(or deferred premium) layer up to a total of $560 million. As the secondary layer
increases, however, it will gradually replace the government indemnity. The
date a t which this occurs will depend primarily on the amount set as the deferred premium and on the rate a t which new power reactors come into licensed
operation.
The table below shows when the replacement of government indemnity
would occur assuming deferred premiums of $2, 3 , 4 or 5 million, and assuming
174 reactors with operating licenses in 1985.
operating reactor deferred premiums
[Dollar amounts i n millions]

In other words, assuming a deferred premium of $4 million and 174 reactors
licensed for operation, the government indemnity would be eliminated by 1982
and, thereafter, the limit on liability will be increased as additional reactors are
licensed to operate. At a deferred premium level of $4 million per reactor, the
overall limit would reach a billion dollars in about 1988, assuming 265 reactors.
Lowenstein, supra note 19, a t 599-600 (footnotes omitted). The NRC has recently set the
figure for the deferred premium a t $5 million. 10 C.F.R. Q 140.11(a)(4) (1978).
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amendments provide that the upper limit of aggregate liability
may be increased to the extent that the fund created by the
deferred premium plan, when added to the initial level of financial protection required, exceeds $560 million.28Furthermore,
these most recent amendments include a proviso requiring Congress to step in and take whatever action may be necessary to
"protect the public"29in the event of a catastrophic nuclear incident where the limit of aggregate liability might be exceeded.30
C. Reasonable, Certain, and Adequate Provision for 0 btaining
Compensation
In the case of Cherokee Nation v . Southern Kansas
Railway, 31 the Supreme Court indicated that the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment32requires that holders of
vested property interests be given "reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation" before their interests can be disturbed by state-mandated action.33In this case,
Congress, by virtue of the eminent domain power of the federal
government, had granted to the railway company a right-of-way
through Cherokee Nation lands. When the parties failed to agree
on the price to be paid for the right-of-way, three independent
appraisers were appointed to value the land according to the
statutory plan. Before proceeding with construction the railway
company was required to pay into the district court double the
amount of the appraisers' average figure, the actual amount of
compensation to be determined a t a trial de novo in district court.
A major issue in the case concerned the question of whether the
Cherokee Nation was entitled to full compensation prior to the
time its property interests were disturbed. This issue arose because plaintiffs feared the railway company might become insolvent before the lower court could reach a conclusion as to the
value of the land. The Supreme Court found that the fifth amendment required not prior compensation but only "reasonable, cer28. 42 U . S . C . 2210(e) (1976).
29. Id.
30. Id. These 1975 amendments were apparently in response to public criticism of the
Act. Critics generally pointed to the possibility of uncompensated injuries and to the
"subsidy" afforded the nuclear power industry by the indemnification arrangement. See,
e . g , Collier, Are the "No Recourse"R-ovisions of the Price-AndersonAct Valid or Unconstitutional?, 4 Hous. L. REV. 236 (1966).
31. 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
32. U.S. CONST.amend. V: "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation."
33. 135 U.S. at 659.
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tain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation." The
Court then added the caveat that absolute certainty of compensation could not, however, be reasonably required since such a requirement would be, in the words of the Court, "impra~ticable."~~
The Cherokee Nation principle t h a t the Constitution requires reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining
compensation has been applied consistently by the courts in cases
involving governmental powers of eminent domain.35 Most recently, reference was made to this principle by the Supreme
Court in the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases.36The
Reorganization Act Cases arose out of the recent national rail
crisis and Congress' attempt to deal with that crisis through the
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973.37In effect, the 1973 Act
required holders of certain railroad properties to convey their
interests to CONRAIL38in exchange for CONRAIL securities and
federally guaranteed United States Railway Association (USRA)
obligation^.^^ Plaintiffs in the action contended that the Rail Act
effected a "taking of rail properties" without the reasonable, certain, and adequate provisions for obtaining compensation required by the Cherokee Nation case." The Supreme Court disagreed. The opinion primarily vindicates the broad authority of
Congress to take any measure necessary to serve the best interests
of the public when an entire industry, such as the railroad, is
faced with financial collapse. After lengthy discussion of whether
the Act did in fact result in a "taking" analogous to a taking by
eminent domain, the Court found that the "reasonable, certain
and adequate" standard was applicable. Employing this test, the
Court held that the provisions of the Rail Act itself, together with
the availability of supplementary Tucker Act" remedies, were
sufficient to meet the Cherokee Nation test.42
The Supreme Court's reasoning in the Reorganization Act
Cases emphasizes the point that the Cherokee Nation principle
is necessarily limited in its application to situations in which the
eminent domain powers of the state, or reasonably similar pow--

--

-

34. Id. at 660.
35. See, e.g., FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U S . 99, 121-22 (1960); United
States v. Carmack, 329 U S . 230,240 (1946); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U S . 380,402-03 (1895).
36. 419 U S . 102 (1974).
37. 45 U.S.C. $ $ 701-793 (Supp. IV 1974).
38. Consolidated Rail Corporation (CONRAIL)was established by the Act. 45 U.S.C.
0 741 (Supp. IV 1974).
39. The USRA was also created by the 1973 Act. 45 U.S.C. $ 711 (Supp. IV 1974).
40. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U S . at 118.
41. 28 U.S.C. 5 1491 (1976).
42. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 136, 155.
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ers, are being exercised." This is understandable in light of the
fact that the Cherokee Nation Court derived its "reasonable, certain and adequate" standard from the just compensation clause
of the fifth amendment, which on its face is only applicable when
there has been a taking of private property for public use.

D. Prospective Modification of Common Law Rights and
Remedies
Though the government may not take property without just
compensation, innumerable cases hold that the state may, by
legislative action, prospectively modify or even eliminate a common law right or remedy." In particular, a legislature may create,
modify, or eliminate an entire scheme of liability and compensation as long as it protects vested rights and stays within constitutional limitation^.^^
In Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad46
the Supreme Court reviewed a constitutional challenge to the
Railroad Employers' Liability Act." The Act abrogated the common law fellow servant ruled8and severely limited the employer's
resort to the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk. In upholding the validity of the statutory scheme, the
Court relied heavily on the following language:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the
common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law,
and is no more sacred than any other. Rights of property which
have been created by the common law cannot be taken away
43. For the Court's discussion of the "erosion taking" and "conveyance taking" issues
and its struggle to determine whether these issues are sufficiently analogous to a taking
of private property for public use so as to bring into play the body of law dealing with the
just compensation clause, see 419 U.S. a t 122-56.
44. See, e.g., Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76 (1915); Mondou
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R. (Second Employer's Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1912);
Martin v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 203 U.S. 284,295 (1906); Hurtado v. California, 110 U S .
516, 532-33 (1884); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876); Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441
F.2d 1239, 1242 (5th Cir. 1971); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411,416 (W.D.
Okla. 1977).
45. E.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188,197-98 (1917); Mondou v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1,49-50 (1911); Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239,1242
(5th Cir. 1971); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411, 416 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
"Vested" is used in the traditional sense to refer to a right or claim which has accrued or
been perfected. Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239, 1242 (5th Cir. 1971).
46. 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
47. Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version a t 45 U.S.C. $4 51-58 (1970)).
48. The Court in Mondou referred to the fellow servant rule as "[tlhe rule that the
negligence of one employee resulting in injury to another was not to be attributed to their
common employer." 223 U.S. at 49.
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without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may
be changed at the will . . . of the legislature, unless prevented
by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes
is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed,
and to adapt it to the changes of times and circumstances.49

A few years later, the Court in New York Central Railroad
v. WhiteMoutlined a similar analytical framework for reviewing
comprehensive modifications of liability and compensation rules.
In White the Supreme Court considered the New York workmen's
compensation law.51After first reiterating its Mondou position,52
the Court expressly held that a legislature may prospectively
modify an existing body of rules governing liability and compensation, especially if the statute provides a "reasonably just substit ~ t e . "A~court
~
need only determine whether the substitute
method of compensation falls within the limits of permissible
state action.54
In making this determination the Court announced that it
would look at the proposed scheme and consider only whether it
is "arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint of natural
justice."55 The heavy burden of proving the unconstitutionality of
the statute rested with the party challenging the statutory
scheme. Employing a balancing test, the Court sought to determine whether the benefits to potential defendants provided by an
absolute upper limit on damages were offset by significant advantages to potential plaintiffs. The Court found that the certainty
of recovery and the waiver by the employer of various common
law defenses granted the plaintiffs sufficient advantages to make
the balance a fair
In Crane v. Hahlo5' the Supreme Court upheld a legislative
modification of the procedure for determining damage awards
resulting from roadway improvements made by the City of New
York. Once again, the Court focused on the substitute remedy by
declaring that "so long as a substantial and efficient remedy re49. Id. at 50.
50. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).

51. 1914 N.Y.Laws, chs. 41, 316; 1913 N.Y. Laws, ch. 816 (current version at N.Y.
WORK.COMP.
LAW $4 1-401 (McKinney 1965)).
52. 243 U.S. at 198.
53. Id. at 201-02.
54. Id. at 202.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 201-04.
57. 258 U.S. 142 (1922).
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mains or is provided due process of law is not denied by a legislative change."58
An important shift in the Court's framework of analysis can
be detected in the case of Crowell v. B e n ~ o nwhich
, ~ ~ involved a
challenge to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation ActeBO
In reviewing the due process issue, the Court carefully distinguished between the procedural due process and the
substantive due process aspects of the case." Relying primarily
on White, the Court summarily dismissed the substantive due
process attack.62A much more detailed consideration of the procedural due process argument evidenced that the Court was a t
least willing to entertain the notion that such statutorily created
schemes were open to attack on procedural grounds? Ultimately
the Court upheld the statute, though a lengthy dissent, focusing
primarily on the procedural due process issue, was filed by Justice
Brandeis, joined by Justices Stone and R o b e r t ~ The
. ~ ~ Court's
summary dismissal of the substantive due process challenge and
its extensive discussion of the procedural due process issue in
Crowell indicate that legislative modifications of liability and
compensation rules might well be subject to challenge on procedural due process grounds. A substantive due process challenge,
however, will be unavailing as long as the legislatively created
substitute is not arbitrary and unreas~nable.~~
In sum, this line of cases produced several overriding principles that have been applied in later federal court proceeding^:^^
(1)common law rights and remedies may be modified by legislative action as long as the action operates prospectively and affects
58. Id. a t 147.
59. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
60. Ch. 509, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § § 901-950 (1976)).
61. 285 U.S. a t 37. The procedural due process issue concerned the question of
whether the Act should provide for a trial de novo to determine the facts in the event that
a party did not agree with the facts as found by the administrative agency having responsibility for making the initial award. The substantive due process issue involved the question of whether the substitute compensation scheme created by the Act was arbitrary and
unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional. The Court upheld the Act on both issues.
Id. at 37-65.
62. Id. at 41-42.
63. Id. at 42-65.
64. Id. a t 65-95 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 41-42.
66. E.g., Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1971); Swanson v. Bates, 170
F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948); Sparks v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411 (W.D. Okla.
1977); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. America v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1944).
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only nonvested claims of right;" (2) the modification or abolition
of nonvested rights is particularly justifiable if the legislature has
provided a reasonably just substitute remedy;" (3) the legislatively created substitute scheme will pass constitutional muster
as long as it is not "arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standand meets procedural due process repoint of natural justiceMBg
q u i r e m e n t ~and
; ~ ~ (4) in determining the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of the statute, the Court will balance the advantages
to potential defendants on the one hand with the advantages to
potential plaintiffs on the othere71

A. The District Court's Decision
In the case at hand the district court concluded that the
Price-Anderson Act did in fact violate the due process clause by
allowing "the destruction of the property or the lives of those
affected by nuclear catastrophe without reasonable certainty that
the victims will be justly c~mpensated."~~
The court identified
three considerations that led to its conclusion: (1) the limited
amount of recovery allowed by the Act is not rationally related
to the potential losses;73(2) the Act tends to encourage irresponsi67. See, e.g., Keller v. Dravo Corp., 441 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1971).
While conceding that one can have no vested interest in any rule of common
law, these cases emphasized that a right created under such a rule which has
been perfected could not be taken away without being violative of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendents. . . . On the other hand, one cannot be heard to question the sufficiency of due process if the rule of law, which merely held the
potential to create a property right, was changed before any right vested.
Id. a t 1242 (citations omitted).
68. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-02 (1917). The District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma emphasized this point in the following statement:
Moreover, while the prospective direct remedy of an injured person against
a manufacturer has been abolished, an alternative, efficacious remedy against
the United States is substituted. Such a replacement or substitution of remedies, while perhaps not technically necessary for due process, is nonetheless even
more indicative of the satisfaction of due process requirements . . . .
Sparks v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 411, 416 (1977) (emphasis added).
69. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 202 (1916). Speaking of the power
to substitute remedies, the Court in a later case concluded:
In the exercise of that power and to satisfy a public need, a state may choose
the remedy best adapted, in the' legislative judgment, to protect the interests
concerned, provided its choice is not unreasonable or arbitrary, and the procedure it adopts satisfies the constitutional requirements of reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard.
Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931).
70. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 42-65 (1932).
71. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201-04 (1916).
72. 431 F. Supp. a t 222.
73. Id.
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bility on the part of builders and operators of reactor sites;74and,
(3) there is no quid pro quo in the "exchange of burdens and
benefits" between defendants and potential future plaintiff^.'^
The district court treated the first point by noting that in the
event of a major catastrophe, damages to life and property might
well be many times the amount set as the statutory limit.'"n
discussing the second point the court concluded that contrary to
the purpose of the Atomic Energy Act, the removal of the spectre
of unlimited liability encouraged irresponsibility in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors."
The court devoted most of its efforts to discussing the third
point. The court employed a balancing test to determine whether
the advantage to NRC licensees of the statutorily fixed limit on
liability was offset by the advantages to plaintiffs of a certainty
of recovery, a more prompt release of funds, the extension of some
short statutes of limitation, and the waiver of common law defens e ~ . The
' ~ court concluded its balancing test by citing Cherokee
Nation and the Regional Rail Reorganization A et Cases, stating
t h a t the Price-Anderson Act fell short of providing the
"reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation" that due process requires."

B. The Supreme Court's Analysis
The opinion of the Supreme Court, written by Chief Justice
Burger, treated the due process issue only after an extensive discussion of the threshold issues of standing, ripeness, and subject
matter jurisdicti~n.~~'
Three of the Justices wrote opinions con74. Id.
75. Id. at 223.
76. Id. at 222.
77. Id. at 222-23.
78. Id. at 223.
79. Id. a t 224.
80. 98 S. Ct. a t 2628-35.Both the district court h d the Supreme Court devoted
considerable portions of their opinions to the threshold issues of standing and ripeness.
98 S. Ct. at 2630-35;431 F. Supp. a t 218-22.Plaintiffs premised their standing to sue on
the contention that the nuclear plants, when operational, would damage them by releasing
into the atmosphere a small measure of radioactive material and by increasing the water
temperature in adjacent lakes. They further asserted that although the probability of a
major catastrophe is small, it is sufficient to create a present fear and apprehension among
residents of the area. Finally, they argued that in the event of such a catastrophe, the $560
million limit on liability established by the Act might preclude some injured parties from
being fully compensated. The district court made findings that essentially embodied the
plaintiffs' arguments. 431 F. Supp. a t 219-20.
On the standing i s y e the Supreme Court noted that to establish the requisite personal stake in the action the plaintiffs must show a "distinct and palpable injury" (citing
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curring only in the judgment, indicating that they would have
dismissed the case on the threshold issues and never reached the
merits?
Upon reaching the due process issue, the Court found it necessary to first determine the appropriate standard of review.82In
their appeal, Duke Power Company and the NRC argued that the
Price-Anderson Act should be considered under traditionally deferential standards which accord a presumption of constitutionality to congressionally enacted economic regulations in the absence of proof of arbitrariness or irrationality." The Carolina Environmental Study Group, on the other hand, recommended a
less deferential standard on the ground that the Act jeopardized
rights which were "far more important" than the interests considered in traditional substantive due process cases.84After citing
the legislative history of the Act and concluding that the PriceAnderson liability limitation was "a classic example of an economic r e g u l a t i ~ n , "the
~ ~Supreme Court accepted the appellants'
arguments.
The Court then considered in turn each of the three factors
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)) and a "fairly traceable" causal connect.ion
between the injury and the challenged conduct (citing Arlington Heights v. Metropolit,an
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)). 98 S. Ct. a t 2630. The Court found t.hat the
"immediate" adverse environmental and aesthetic consequences of the thermal pollution
of the two lakes constituted sufficiently distinct and palpable injury. Id. a t 26'31. In
addition, i t found a causal link based upon the district court's finding that but for t.he
protection of the Act the nuclear power plants in question would never be completed or
operated. Id. a t 2631-32 (citing 431 F. Supp. a t 219-20).
In addition, the Court refused to require the plaintiffs to demonstrate a connection
between the injuries they claimed and the constitutional rights being asserted. Id. at 26'33.
Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U S . 83, 102 (1968) (requiring plaintiffs in a taxpayer suit, to
establish a subject matter nexus between the right asserted and the injury alleged). The
Court observed that if such a showing were required, an attack on the Price-Anderson
liability limit could not be maintained prior to the occurrence of an accident result.ing in
damages in excess of the statutory limit. 98 S. Ct. a t 2633 n.23.
In determining that the issue was ripe for adjudication, the Supreme Court noted t,hat
delaying decision on the constitutionality of the Act would defeat the Act's purpose of
eliminating doubts and fears on the part of private developers of nuclear power. The Court
further commented that "all parties would be adversely affected by a decision t.o defer
definitive resolution of the constitutional validity vel non of the Price-Anderson Act.." Id.
a t 2635.
81. Four separate opinions were filed in this case: Chief Justice Burger wr0t.e the
opinion of the Court; Justice Stewart concurred in the result (plaintiffs have no st.anding
to sue); Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in the judgment. (lack of
subject matter jurisdiction); Justice Stevens also wrote a separate concurrence (no standing, issues are not ripe for adjudication, no subject matter jurisdiction).
82. 98 S. Ct. a t 2635-36.
83. Id.
84. Id. a t 2636.
85. Id.
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the district court identified in support of its conclusion that the
Act violated the due process clause. As to the contention that the
amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential
losses, the Court conceded that in light of the uncertainty concerning the extent of damage that could result from a major nuclear incident, the choice of any figure as an absolute upper limit
on liability would necessarily represent a somewhat arbitrary decision.' The Court concluded, however, that considering the remoteness of the possibility of an accident involving damages in
excess of the limitation and the current statutory mandate for
Congress to step in and take appropriate action should such a
possibility materialize, Congress' decision to limit liability in
order to promote development of nuclear power was neither arbitrary nor irrational." The limitation figure was also found to be
reasonable and not violative of due process.88
The Supreme Court then dismissed, with two pointed observations, the district court's contention that the Price-Anderson
Act encourages irresponsibility on the part of builders and owners
of nuclear power plants. First, nothing in the Act releases any
potential indemnitee from complying with the strict rules and
regulations of the Atomic Energy Act that control the review of
applications for construction permits or operating licenses." Second, the risk of potential bankruptcy or severe financial loss resulting from damage to the power plant itself is certainly an
incentive to the owner to avoid the irresponsibility feared by the
district court.
The Court also disagreed with the district court's third contention that there was not a sufficient quid pro quo for the ban
on recovery above the specified limit. The Court emphasized that
~ Act
in fulfillment of its objective to "protect the p ~ b l i c "the
assured at least a $560 million recovery fund and in addition
expressly required Congress to take further appropriate action in
the event of a major nuclear catastrophe." The Court found that
these provisions constitute a reasonably just substitute for potential plaintiffs' common law remedies, especially in light of the
very real possibility that the resources of a potential defendant
86. Id. at 2637.
87. Id.. at 2637-38.
88. Id. at 2638.
89. Id. See also the Supreme Court's discussion of NRC regulation in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 98 S. Ct. 1197, 1203 (1978).
90. 98 S. Ct. at 2640.
91. Id. at 2639-40.
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would be exhausted at a figure much lower than the $560 million
fund guaranteed by the Act.
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the waiver of defenses required by the Acta benefits potential plaintiffs in a significant way by eliminating the delay and uncertainty that would
result if it were necessary to litigate the question of liability after
a major accident.93The Court added that common law strict liability was subject to exceptions for acts of God or of third parties
whereas no such exceptions exist under the Price-Anderson Act?'
In summing up its position on the quid pro quo issue the Court
declared:
The Price-Anderson Act not only provides a reasonable, prompt
and equitable mechanism for compensating victims of a catastrophic nuclear incident, it also guarantees a level of net compensation generally exceeding that recoverable in private litigation. Moreover, the Act contains an explicit congressional commitment to take further action to aid victims of a nuclear accident in the event that the $560 million ceiling on liability is
exceeded. This panoply of remedies and guarantees is at the
least a reasonably just substitute for the common-law rights
replaced by the Due Process Clause. Nothing more is required
by the Due Process Clause.s5

After summarily dismissing any challenge based on the equal
protection clause," the Court pronounced its final judgment, reversing the decision of the district court and remanding for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.g7

III. ANALYSIS
It is important to note at the outset that both the district
court and the Supreme Court chose to confine their due process
analyses to the question of substantive rather than procedural
violations of the due process clause. The opinions do not discuss
problems of notice or opportunity for a hearing-the traditional
components of procedural due process analysis? Indeed, it is
92. 42 U.S.C. 9 2210(n) (1976).
93. 98 S. Ct. at 2640.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2641.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).The Supreme Court in Fuentes
stated:
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has
been clear: "Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and
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highly unlikely that a challenge to the Price-Anderson Act on
procedural due process grounds would be effective. The Act does
not prevent any injured party from filing a claim and appearing
before a district court. It only potentially limits the amount of
recovery in the event that aggregate damages exceed the statutory limit. All potential plaintiffs will have an opportunity for a
hearing and will recover some portion of the value of their legitimate claims as long as the disbursement of funds is properly
administered by the district court.
A.

The Appropriate Standard of Review

Before discussing the district court's due process objections
to the Price-Anderson Act, the Supreme Court paused to determine the appropriate standard of review to be applied in the
case.9gThe failure to clearly identify the proper standard of review was the critical flaw in the district court's analysis. Indeed
it is surprising, considering the district court's choice to deal with
the Act on substantive due process grounds, that there was no
discussion in its opinion of the legislative purpose behind the Act
or of the relationship between the objectives of the Act and the
means employed to achieve them. Under traditional substantive
due process analysis, the court must inquire as to the legitimacy
of the legislative objective and the reasonableness of the means
employed to further that objective. As originally stated in Neb bia
v. New Yo~~,~OO
due process "demands only that the law shall not
be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object
sought to be attained."lol Later cases have indicated, as the Supreme Court in this case reiterated, that this approach affords
great deference to legislative determinations.ln2In stark contrast
to this traditional approach, the district court's opinion made
virtually no reference to the objectives of the Price-Anderson Act
and therefore failed to raise the question of whether the means
employed were reasonably related to the objectives of the Act.lo3
in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified." . . . It is
equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
"must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Id. (citations omitted).
99. 98 S. Ct. at 2635-36.
100. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
101. Id. at 525.
102. 98 S. Ct. at 2635-36. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U S . 1,
15 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Opt,ical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423
(1952); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937).
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The Supreme Court, on the other hand, referred constantly
throughout its opinion to the Act's "dual purpose" of protecting
the public and encouraging the development of the atomic energy
industry.lo4Given such objectives, the Court reasoned that the
Price-Anderson Act was a clear example of the kind of legislative
accommodation of "the burdens and benefits of economic life"
that it had recently declared should be judged by the deferential
standards developed in earlier substantive due process cases.lo5
Accordingly, the Court pointed out that the burden was on the
party claiming the due process violation to show that the legislative action was arbitrary or irrational.

B. Reasonable Compensation for Potential Damages
The district court's conclusion that the "amount of recovery
is not rationally related to the potential losses"106was based solely
on the observation that the potential damage from a major catastrophe could be many times the statutory limit.lo7The Supreme Court took issue with this overly simplistic analysis and
examined various factors that justify the establishment of a reasonable limit on liability. The Court noted, for example, that
expert opinion as to maximum potential damage was highly speculative and that the record indicated the possibility of any incident's exceeding the liability limit is extremely remote.lo8In
essence, the Court indicated it was proper for the legislature to
weigh and reasonably accommodate the competing interests of
the public for assurance of compensation and of private industry
for a limitation on total liability. The Court then chose not to
interfere with the policy balance implicit in the legislative enactment.
In vindicating the legislatively established limit on liability
the Court may have overstated its case by relying on the recently
added language to the Price-Anderson Act that requires Congress
to intervene and "take whatever action is deemed necessary and
appropriate" in the event of a nuclear incident involving damages
in excess of the statutory limit.lo9Although this proviso is superfi--

103. The district court's sole reference to the legislative objectives of the PriceAnderson Act appeared in a parenthetical statement during its brief discussion of the
equal protection issue. 431 F. Supp. at 225.
104. E.g., 98 S. Ct. at 2626, 2636, 2639.
105. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
106. 431 F. Supp. at 222.
107. Id.
108. 98 S. Ct. at 2636-37 & n.28.
109. 42 U.S.C. 4 2210(e) (1976).
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cially reassuring, it is doubtful that it contributes in any concrete
way to the potential relief available to plaintiffs who sustain injury from a major nuclear catastrophe. In fact, the vague nature
of the mandate to take "appropriate action" renders the proviso
virtually meaningless. Furthermore, the language of the proviso
establishes Congress itself as the ultimate determiner of what
constitutes "necessary and appropriate" action and thus appears
to preclude any resort to the courts for review of the appropriateness of congressional action or inaction. 110 This works to the disadvantage of both potential plaintiffs who might wish to challenge
an action as insufficient and potential defendants-the owners
and operators of nuclear power plants-who are left to wonder
whether an "appropriate" action might include the imposition of
additional liability.
Although the Court's reliance on this provision is perhaps
overemphasized, such reliance does not detract significantly from
the Court's conclusion that the amount of recovery under the Act
is reasonably related to the Act's legitimate objectives of protecting the public and encouraging the development of the nuclear
power industry. The significance of the Court's opinion on this
point lies in its recognition t h a t the pondering of
"imp~nderables"~~~
and the weighing of competing interests is a
matter properly left to the discretion of the legislative branch. A
decision made by Congress should not be judicially supplanted
absent a showing that it was arbitrary or irrational and therefore
unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.

C. Limited Liability and the Encouragement of Irresponsibility
The district court's second due process objection to the Act
was that it tends to encourage irresponsibility in the construction
and operation of reactor sites.l12 In making this conclusion the
court considered only the economic incentives that might encour--

110. The specific language of the proviso reads:
Provided, That in the event of a nuclear incident involving damages in excess
of that amount of aggregate liability, the Congress will thoroughly review the
particular incident and will take whatever action is deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of a disaster of such
magnitude . . . .

Id.
111. 98 S. Ct. at 2637-38. The Court made reference to such "imponderables" as the
remoteness of the possibility of a major catastrophe and the necessity of choosing a figure
high enough to provide the public reasonable assurance of some compensation for injuries
yet low enough to allay the fears of private developers of nuclear power.
112. 431 I?. Supp. a t 222.
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age or discourage responsibility in the nuclear power industry.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, correctly noted that in
addition to these economic incentives the strict statutory requirements of the Atomic Energy Act are designed specifically to deal
with the concerns of reactor safety and environmental protection.Il3 The Act is replete with provisions requiring the NRC to
promulgate safety standards and ensure that those standards are
met by NRC licensees.114
The Supreme Court might also have noted that upon its
creation in 1971 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was
specifically authorized to impose strict standards on licensees of
the NRC.l15 The safety record of the industry over its brief lifespan indicates that the NRC and its licensees have adhered well
to government standards116and that, apparently, there is little
need for the economic incentives envisioned by the district court.
In any event, since only NRC licensees may construct or operate
reactor sites and since all such licensees are subject to the strict
regulation of the NRC and the EPA, the Supreme Court had
substantial justification for concluding that the tendency to irresponsibility noted by the district court is effectively curbed by
comprehensive governmental regulation of the nuclear power industry.

D. Balancing of Burdens and Benefits-The Reasonably Just
Substitute Test
In its third and final due process criticism of the PriceAnderson Act, the district court found that the limit on total
liability benefited NRC licensees without exacting a significant
113. 42 U.S.C. § $ 2011-2296 (1976). In its statement of purpose, the Act proclaims:
I t is the purpose of this chapter to effectuate the policies set forth above by
providing for-

...

(d) a program to encourage widespread participation in the development
and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent
consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and safety
of the public . . . .
Id. a t § 2013(d). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 98 S. Ct. 1197,
1203 (1978).
114. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1976) (conditions for issuance of a commercial license);
Id. 9 2201 (general duties of the Commission); Id. 8 2232 (requirements for license application); Id. 15 2236 (allowing revocation of license for failure to observe safety standards);
Id. 9 2241 (establishing Atomic Safety Licensing Board).
115. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072, 1073 (1966-1970 Compilat.ion),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app., a t 827, 828 (1976).
116. Marrone, The Price-Anderson Act: The Insurance Industry's View, 12 FORUM
605, 609-11 (1977).
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quid pro quo from the licensees.l17 The district court's failure to
determine a t the outset the appropriate standard of review
caused it to depart significantly from traditional analysis and to
tip the scales of its balancing test in such a way as to find the
Price-Anderson Act unconstitutionally advantageous to the defendants.
The problem was largely one of assigning the burden of proof
to the wrong party..The district court seized upon language from
Cherokee Nation and the Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases
and required the defendant to show that the statutory scheme
afforded "reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compen~ation."~~~
By imposing the strict Cherokee Nation
standard, the court in essence shifted the responsibility to the
defendant to show the constitutionality of the Act.
In contrast, the Supreme Court determined that the burden
properly rests with the party challenging the Act on substantive
due process grounds to show that the legislation is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Therefore, while the district court had loaded its
scale in favor of the challengers, the Supreme Court tilted its own
in favor of the constitutionality of the Act. In both courts the
outcome of the balancing test was largely determined by the
weighting of the scales.
In the process of applying its balancing test, the Supreme
Court resurrected the "reasonably just substitute" test developed
years earlier in New York Central Railroad v. White1lDand
Crowell v. Benson. 120 While the district court had devoted considerable discussion to the exchange of burdens and benefits effected
by the provisions of the Act, the Supreme Court directed its analysis to the more narrow question of whether the Act provides a
reasonably just substitute for the common law or state tort law
remedies it replaces.121
In reaching the determination that the Price-Anderson compensation scheme provides a reasonable substitute remedy, the
Court relied heavily on the one aspect of the legislative scheme
that the district court had totally overlooked-that in furtherance
of its stated objective to "protect the public" the Act is designed
to provide a guaranteed minimum fund from which recovery can
be made following a major catastrophe. As commentators have
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

431 F. Supp. at 223.
Id. at 224.
243 U.S. 188 (1917).
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
98 S. Ct. at 2638-41.
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notedln and common sense dictates, allowing unlimited recovery
under common law principles does not ensure that funds will be
available to satisfy judgments against the tortfeasor. Since at the
time of initial passage of the Act liability insurance was only
available to the nuclear power industry in a limited amount,123
the Act provided a mechanism whereby the public would be guaranteed recovery up to a reasonable limit. This crucial aspect of
the Price-Anderson Act and the bearing it has on the reasonableness of the substitute remedy provided by the Act was apparently
never considered by the district court.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, devoted considerable
time to a discussion of this congressional assurance of recovery.
The Court, in fact, treated in only the most cursory manner the
multiple factors enumerated in the district court's opinion as
contributing to the conclusion that there was no quid pro quo?
By choosing to limit itself to a consideration of whether the Act
provides a reasonably just substitute remedy, the Supreme Court
refused to embark on the perilous course traveled by the district
court in its multifactored approach to the balancing test. Thus,
the Court laid to rest any speculation that in the realm of legislatively created compensation schemes the traditionally deferential
standards of substantive due process analysis might give way to
a less deferential and consequently more highly interventionist
standard of review. The Court essentially outlined a safe harbor
for legislators, putting them on notice that modifications of common law compensation schemes will continue to pass muster
under the due process clause as long as the legislation provides a
substitute remedy that is "reasonably just." A scheme that substitutes the certainty of some recovery, albeit limited, for the
possibility of no recovery whatsoever is, in the Court's opinion,
"reasonably just ."
122. E.g.,Lowenstein, supra note 19, a t 602. Lowenstein states:
Finally, it should be noted that the right to sue abo4e the limit of liability
would not assure the ability t o collect. Since the waiver of defenses by persons
sued would not apply above the amount of insurance and indemnity available,
it might take years to reach a final adjudication in the courts and even then
there is no assurance that persons adjudicated to be liable would have resources
to pay judgments.

Id.
123. Marrone, supra note 116, a t 607.
124. 431 F. Supp. a t 223-24. The district court considered, among other factors, the
relative merits of Price-Anderson strict liability, the effectiveness of the Act's bankruptcytype provisions for distribution of funds, the impact of the Act's extension of stat.ut.es of
limitation, and the uncertain nature of the Act's proviso requiring Congress to take furt.her
appropriate action in the event of a major nuclear catastrophe. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the provisions of the Price-Anderson
Act have historically been the subject of much controversy outside the courtroom.125Aside from the case at hand, however, no
reported cases can be found in which the Act's constitutionality
has been challenged. This is probably due to the standing and
ripeness difficulties encountered by litigants in challenging a
statute that does nbt purport to adversely affect any compensation for damages less than $560 million in the aggregate. There
have been no claims alleging damages in excess of the $560 million limit. Those who criticize the Act base their criticism largely
upon opposition to nuclear power in general rather than to the
theoretical construct of the Act itself. However, when opponents
have engaged in some sort of legal analysis of the provisions of the
Act, the due process clause is most often seen as the likely tool
for declaring the Act to be inva1id.l" This case represents the first
reasoned analysis by the courts of the due process issue so often
invoked by opponents of Price-Anderson and nuclear power.
The district court's analysis suffered in a t least two highly
significant respects. First of all, the court imposed on the defendants the heavy burden of showing that the Act afforded
"reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation," a standard premised on the just compensation clause
and only applied previously to situations in which a taking of
vested private property interests for public use was a t issue. Had
the court used the traditional standard and required the plaintiff
to show that the Act was arbitrary and unreasonable, there is
little doubt that the court's balancing process would have been
significantly altered.
The district court also neglected to seek out and thoughtfully
consider the stated objectives of the Price-Anderson Act. In particular, the court failed to recognize the crucial point that one of
the primary purposes of the Act was to protect the public by
guaranteeing a substantial fund from which claims for damages
resulting from a major nuclear incident could be satisfied, regardless of the solvency of the tortfeasor. This oversight contributed
significantly to the court's seeming predisposition to find the Act
unconstitutional.
125. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 30; Comment, The Irradiated Plaintiff: Tort Recovery Outside Price-Anderson, 6 ENVT'LL. 859 (1976); Note, the "Extraordinary Nuclear
Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson Act, 6
RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 360 (1974).
126. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 30, at 249-68.
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The Supreme Court's opinion is at least as significant for
what it chose not to do as for what it did do. The Court staunchly
resisted the invitation to abandon the deferential postdepression
standards of substantive due process analysis in economic matters. Instead, the Court resurrected and reaffirmed the reasonably
just substitute test developed in New York Central Railroad v.
Whiteln and crowell v. B e n ~ o n las~ ~a safe harbor for legislative
modifications of common law compensation schemes.
On a more practical level, the Court laid to rest doubts concerning the continued vitality of the Price-Anderson Act as a tool
for encouraging private development of nuclear power while at
the same time assuring a source of funds from which public liability claims may be satisfied in the event of a major nuclear incident. Although many will insist that the Court should have dismissed the case for lack of standing, ripeness, or subject matter
jurisdiction, the fact remains that the Court did deal with the
case on its merits and has thereby removed the cloud of uncertainty that had descended upon the nuclear power industry since
the district court's decision.

David M. Connors
127. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
128. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).

